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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Weapons Acquisition Reform: Reform Act Is Helping DoD 
Acquisition Programs Reduce Risk, but Implementation 
Challenges Remain 
Michael J. Sullivan—Sullivan is the director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management, U.S. 
Government Accountability Office. This group has responsibility for examining the effectiveness of the 
DoD’s acquisition and procurement practices in meeting its mission performance objectives and 
requirements. In addition to directing reviews of major weapon system acquisitions such as the Joint 
Strike Fighter, F-22, Global Hawk, and various other major weapon acquisition programs, Sullivan 
has developed and directs a body of work examining how the DoD can apply best practices to the 
nation’s largest and most technically advanced weapon systems acquisition system. This work has 
spanned a broad range of issues critical to the successful delivery of systems, including technology 
development, product development, transition to production, software development, program 
management, requirement-setting, cost estimating, and strategic portfolio management. The findings 
and recommendations from this work have played a major role in the department’s recent acquisition 
policy revisions. Most recently, he has directed the GAO’s annual assessment of major weapon 
systems programs for the Congress and GAO’s work with Congress in establishing acquisition policy 
reforms. His team also provides the Congress with early warning on technical and management 
challenges facing these investments. Sullivan has been with the GAO for 24 years. He received a 
bachelor's degree in political science from Indiana University and a master’s degree in public 
administration from the School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University. 
[sullivanm@gao.gov] 
Introduction 
For several decades, the GAO has reported on poor outcomes encompassing cost 
and schedule growth on the Department of Defense’s (DoD’s) major weapon acquisition 
programs. Many problems can be traced to a culture where the military services begin 
programs with inflexible requirements, immature technologies, and overly optimistic cost and 
schedule estimates. Given pressures to reduce spending across the government, including 
the DoD, finding ways to prevent or mitigate cost growth is crucial to U.S. national security. 
A solid program foundation using good developmental testing and systems engineering, and 
reliable cost estimates is needed in order to help avoid cost overruns and promote better 
acquisition outcomes. There have been numerous attempts in the past to improve DoD 
acquisition outcomes, including the Packard Commission (President’s Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management, 1986), the Goldwater–Nichols Act in the 1980s 
(1986), and the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994. More recently, Congress 
passed the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 (Reform Act)1 to improve the 
way weapon systems are acquired and avoid cost and schedule overruns. 
In 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee asked us to begin reporting on the 
DoD’s implementation of Reform Act provisions and the impact the Reform Act has had on 
weapon acquisition programs. This is our third report addressing these topics. The first 
report focused on the DoD’s initial efforts to implement Reform Act provisions for systems 
engineering and developmental testing, including the placement of new offices for these 
activities within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD; GAO, 2010). Our second 
report examined the challenges the Services face as they try to strengthen systems 
engineering and developmental testing activities on weapon acquisition programs (GAO, 
                                                
1 As amended by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 
111-383 §§ 813 and 1075, and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-81 §§ 819 and 837. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= - 320 - 
=
2011b). This report examines (1) the DoD’s progress in implementing Reform Act 
provisions; (2) the impact the Reform Act has had on specific acquisition programs; and (3) 
challenges remaining in improving the weapons acquisition process. 
We conducted this performance audit from January 2012 to December 2012 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 
provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Background 
In May 2009, Congress passed the Reform Act in an effort to improve the way 
weapon systems are acquired and avoid further cost overruns on such programs. When 
signing the Reform Act into law, the President stated that its purpose was to limit weapon 
system cost overruns and that it would strengthen oversight and accountability by appointing 
officials who will closely monitor the weapons systems acquisition process to ensure that 
costs are controlled. 
Four offices were established as a result of the Reform Act: SE, DT&E, CAPE, and 
PARCA. The SE and CAPE offices existed under other organizational titles prior to the 
Reform Act. Staffing levels, following the Reform Act, remained relatively stable for both of 
these offices, but some reorganization was necessary to reflect new Reform Act 
responsibilities. The DT&E and PARCA offices were newly established. The key roles and 
responsibilities of these four offices as outlined in the Reform Act are explained in Table 1.  
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 Key Responsibilities of Offices Established as a Result of the 
Reform Act 
Office Primary responsibilities 
Systems Engineering 
 
 serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on systems 
engineering activities in the department 
 develops systems engineering and development planning guidance for the 
DoD 
 reviews and approves major defense acquisition program systems engineering 
plans 
 monitors major defense acquisition program systems engineering activities 
 reports to Congress annually on systems engineering organization, 




 serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on 
developmental test and evaluation activities 
 develops developmental test and evaluation guidance for the DoD 
 reviews and approves major defense acquisition program developmental test 
and evaluation plans 
 monitors and reviews acquisition program developmental test and evaluation 
activities of major defense acquisition programs 
 reports to Congress annually on developmental test and evaluation 
organization, capabilities, and activities 
Cost Assessment and 
Program Evaluation  
 serves as principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and other senior 
officials on matters related to cost analysis and the planning and programming 
phases of the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution system 
 develops independent cost estimates for major defense acquisition programs 
prior to major milestone decisions and updates independent cost estimates 
when programs have exceeded critical cost thresholds, known as Nunn–
McCurdy breaches 
 reviews existing systems and methods for tracking and assessing operation 
and support costs on major defense acquisition programs 
 develops analysis of alternative study guidance for major defense acquisition 
programs 
 approves the analysis of alternatives study plan for each major defense 
acquisition program 
Performance 
Assessments and Root 
Cause Analyses 
 assesses major acquisition program performance through independent 
analyses and through the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary process 
 identifies the root causes of cost growth and other problems on programs that 
experience a critical Nunn–McCurdy cost breach  
Note. This table was created using GAO analysis of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 
2009. 
In addition to the new organizational requirements, the Reform Act requires the DoD 
to ensure that the acquisition strategy for major defense acquisition programs includes 
measures to ensure competition or the option of competition throughout the program life 
cycle. This could include strategies such as maintaining two sources for a system (dual-
sourcing) and breaking requirements for supplies or services previously provided or 
performed under a single contract into separate smaller contracts (unbundling of contracts; 
Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, § 202). Major defense acquisition 
programs are also required to provide for competitive prototyping—where two or more 
competing teams produce prototypes before a design is selected for further development—
prior to Milestone B unless a waiver is properly granted by the milestone decision authority 
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(Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, § 202(a)),2 and to meet the following 
Milestone B certification requirements, including:3 
 Appropriate trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives 
have been made to ensure the program is affordable; 
 A preliminary design review and formal post-preliminary design review 
assessment have been conducted and on the basis of such assessment the 
program demonstrates a high likelihood of accomplishing its intended 
mission; 
 Technology has been demonstrated in a relevant environment on the basis of 
an independent review and assessment by the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Research and Engineering; 
 Reasonable cost and schedule estimates have been developed to execute, 
with concurrence of the Director of CAPE, the program’s product 
development and production plan; 
 Funding is available to execute the program’s product development and 
production plan; 
 The DoD has completed an analysis of alternatives with respect to the 
program; and 
 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council4 has approved program 
requirements, including an analysis of the operational requirements. 
The Reform Act also requires the Joint Requirements Oversight Council to ensure 
trade-offs among cost, schedule, and performance objectives are considered for joint 
military requirements (Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009, § 201).  The GAO 
previously reported that the Council considered trade-offs made by the military services 
before validating requirements, but the military services did not consistently provide high-
quality resource estimates to the Council for proposed programs in fiscal year 2010. We also 
found that the Council did not prioritize requirements, consider redundancies across 
proposed programs, or prioritize and analyze capability gaps in a consistent manner (GAO, 
2011a). 
                                                
2 Specifically, the Reform Act required the DoD to modify its guidance relating to the operation of its 
acquisition system to incorporate these competitive prototyping provisions. The DoD did so through 
Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09-027, Implementation of Weapon System Acquisition Reform 
Act of 2009 (Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating Change 3, Dec. 9, 2011). Major defense acquisition 
programs are those estimated by the DoD to require an eventual total expenditure for research, 
development, test, and evaluation, including all planned increments, of more than $365 million, or for 
procurement, including all planned increments, of more than $2.19 billion in fiscal year 2000 constant 
dollars or designated by the USD(AT&L). The Milestone Decision Authority for major defense 
acquisition programs is the USD(AT&L), the head of a DoD component, or if delegated the 
component acquisition executive.   
3 Pub. L. No. 111-23; various sections, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2366b. The Reform Act revised the 
Milestone B certification requirements for trade-offs, preliminary design, technology demonstration, 
and reasonable cost and schedule estimates. The remaining Milestone B certification requirements 
bulleted here were unrevised by the Reform Act.  
4 The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is an advisory council to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff with the responsibility to: (1) identify, assess, and approve joint military requirements; (2) 
assist acquisition officials in identifying alternatives to acquisition programs; and (3) assist the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in assigning priority for joint military requirements.   
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Findings 
The GAO’s analysis of 11 weapon acquisition programs showed the Reform Act has 
reinforced early attention to requirements, cost and schedule estimates, testing, and 
reliability. For example, prior to starting development, an independent review team raised 
concerns about the Ground Combat Vehicle program’s many requirements and the risks 
associated with its seven-year schedule. Subsequently, the Army reduced the number of 
requirements by about 25% and prioritized them, giving contractors more flexibility in 
designing solutions. In addition, the developmental test and evaluation office—resulting from 
the Reform Act—used test results to help the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program develop a 
more realistic reliability goal and a better approach to reach it. Shown in Table 2 are areas 
where the Reform Act influenced several programs in the GAO’s review. 
 Reform Act Influence on Case Study Programs 
Program Requirements  Cost and schedule Testing Reliability 
Before Milestone B 
Ground Combat Vehicle         
Joint Light Tactical Vehiclea         
Ohio Class Replacement         
Ship to Shore Connectora       
After Milestone B 
Joint Strike Fighter      
Global Hawk        
Gray Eagle         
KC-46 Tanker       
Littoral Combat Ship Seaframe      
Remote Minehunting System        
Small Diameter Bomb II        
Notes. This table was created using GAO analysis of DoD data. 
a During the course of our review, the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and Ship to Shore Connector 
programs held a Milestone B review. 
While the DoD has taken steps to implement most of the fundamental Reform Act 
provisions, some key efforts to date have been primarily focused on the DoD’s largest 
weapon acquisition programs. The DoD faces five challenges—organizational capability 
constraints, the need for additional guidance on cost estimating and Reform Act 
implementation, the uncertainty about the sufficiency of systems engineering and 
developmental testing resources, limited dissemination of lessons learned, and cultural 
barriers between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military services—
that limit its ability to broaden the Reform Act’s influence to more programs. Service officials 
believe additional guidance is needed to improve their cost estimates and other 
implementation efforts. They also believe that lessons learned from programs that 
experience significant cost and schedule increases should be shared more broadly within 
the acquisition community. These challenges seem straightforward to address, but they may 
require more resources, which have been difficult to obtain. Ensuring the services have key 
leaders and staff dedicated to systems engineering and developmental testing activities, 
such as chief engineers at the service level and technical leads on programs, as well as 
breaking down cultural barriers are more difficult to address. They will require continued 
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monitoring and attention by the USD(AT&L), service acquisition executives, and offices 
established as a result of the Reform Act to address. 
Recommendations 
The GAO recommends the DoD develop additional cost estimating and Reform Act 
implementation guidance; make lessons learned available to the acquisition community; and 
assess the adequacy of the military services’ systems engineering and developmental 
testing workforce. The DoD generally concurred with the recommendations. The GAO 
clarified one recommendation to make it clear that the DoD needs to designate an office(s) 
within the Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics organization to provide practical Reform 
Act implementation guidance to program offices. 
For a more detailed discussion of our findings, as well as our scope and 
methodology, see www.gao.gov/products/gao-13-103. 
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